The Concept of Autonomy in Oppressed People – Part II
By Francesca Malloggi
Independent Researcher, Writer, Tuscany, Italy
Introduction by Venkat
In this part, Francesca continues on the subject of autonomy of oppressed people with the published views of Nussbaum and Khader in the light of the oppressed people’s ‘Adaptive Preferences’. Francesca attempts to point at the considerations that seem to be lacking in the basis to consider APs as behaviors devoid of choice and hence the fundamental desire. The insights provided are well formed and the author’s argument brings out the nuances involved in the complex decision making among choices and the perception of one’s good.
Indeed all of us (including the oppressed) always face the need to trade off between priorities, goals, people, choice of time, and choice of place. We can neither be always alone nor be always together with others and yet we have to meet our own personal goals as well as the various obligations with others for specific needs in various aspects or times in our lives. Behavior is never as simple as it might look in appearance to the sensory perception. This work by Francesca is enlightening to all those who are keen observers of people, relationships and society. Looking forward to the next part of this article.
Chapter 1. Nussbaum- Kadher about the Concept of Autonomy
There are two critical and related views about people with APs. The first one is that those people lack autonomy and the second one is that they have a deprived sense of self. Treating people as lacking of autonomy means to assume that APs are unchosen. It implies that these women are subordinated and they have built their sense of the good based on other’s view. 11 I argue that this is morally wrong as well as a practical mistake because they fail to see that those people have no options and they are just choosing the less unpleasant of possible choices.
One of the most compelling arguments in favor of the view that people who hold APs are without autonomy is that they are without a sense of their own good12. Nussbaum entails that they are not autonomous since every autonomous person knows what desires are suitable or unsuitable. Suggesting the list of Central Human Capabilities, Nussbaum assumes they are incapable of seeing some “central desires”13. Using the word central Nussbaum refers to the entitlement of desires fundamental for “political purposes and more indispensable to a human’s being quality of life”14. Indeed, she claims that “this list contains many items that women over the ages have not wanted for themselves”15 Thus, looking at this list, she aims at granting rights to women and making the good available for them16.
Firstly, I argue that if they were lacking the sense of the good, they could not have followed their interest. Nussbaum would claim that they go indeed against their own interest by accepting some deprived status17. However, she failed to see that they demonstrate to have the sense of their interest, which is not disconnected to a sense of the good. These women show to hold the sense of their interest as well as a sense of good, when they act according to some normative norms. Following those norms, which appear to be against their interest, they apparently go against their own good, but it is also true that they do so just in one aspect of their life, and not overall. Those women are able to negotiate and balance between interests in order to achieve what is available in their situations. Yet, it is because they want to hold a comprehensive/more general idea of good for themselves that they sacrifice other aspects18. This means that they do not pursue an interest, which is against their own good, like deciding of not complaining about the lack of clean water, because they think that sacrificing that will lead to having a greater good in other/more important dimensions of their lives.
Thus, I would not say that these women don’t hold the sense of good since they demonstrate an ability to make sensitive plans. Moreover, on Khader’s account, this mean that Nussbaum misidentifies trade-off, failing to see “that adaptive preferences sometimes involve less of one good to attain more of another. Those who cannot access flourishing in all domains of life may be forced to sacrifice basic flourishing in one domain to achieve it in another”19. If we agree that there must be a conception of the good, it is not a lack of autonomy that distinguishes APs from non-APs. Nussbaum’s intuition is wrong when she claims that those people lack of an autonomously formed concept of the good, and that consequently to oppressive social condition they lack the sense of self-entitlement. In the following I will debunk this second position.
By Francesca Malloggi
Independent Researcher, Writer, Tuscany, Italy
References
- 9 This position in in line with Khadler’s view, see her book [Khadler, 2009]
- 10 Khader says that “the appropriate type of intervention can increase people’s capacities to live in accordance with their deeply held desires for flourishing and their personal and cultural values” [Khader, 2009] p.5
- 11 Nussbaum wants to avoid the problem of paternalism. The problem is that, avoiding paternalism we feel entitled of some rights over other’s people decision and I do not think this is the right way to get involved in these situations.
- 12 [Nussbaum, 2001]p.68
- 13 [Nussbaum, 2001]p.68
- 14 [Nussbaum, 2001]p.68
- 15 [Nussbaum, 2001]p.68
- 16 [Nussbaum, 2001] p.69
- 17 [Nussbaum, 2001]
- 18 [Khader, 2009]
- 19 [Khader, 2009*] See Khadler’s paper p. 12
Francesca Malloggi works as a holistic practitioner and she is the creator of Templia B&B in Italy. Templia wants to be a place where art, philosophy and health are combined together in the same living space.
She has a Master Degree in Philosophy and Public Affairs at the University of Amsterdam. She defines herself as an independent researcher of truth. She is interested in studying spirituality and body wellness.